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7 ‘We are more than Alliances between 
Groups’
A Social Psychological Perspective on the Gezi Park 
Protesters and Negotiating Levels of Identity
Özden Melis Uluğ and Yasemin Gülsüm Acar
‘On the f irst day we were terrorists; on the second day we were provocateurs; on 
the third day we were demonstrators; on the fourth day we became the people’
Sign in Gezi Park
The Gezi Park protests brought together people from a variety of walks 
of life. Though nearly half of the protesters claimed they had not previ-
ously participated in any kind of social action, protests were largely 
started and maintained through extant activists, NGOs and political 
organisations. Some members of these groups had previously protested 
together, but many were coming together for the f irst time. With the 
poorly-chosen words of Prime Minister Erdoğan, protesters were able to 
f ind a new identity under the guise of çapulcu, which allowed them to 
see themselves as part of a greater whole while still maintaining their 
original allegiances.
This chapter will examine constructs of social activism and identity 
from a social psychological perspective in order to better understand the 
structure of the Gezi Park protests, the participants and the way they negoti-
ated identities. A background to the protests and the participants will be 
provided, followed by a brief review of the social psychological perspective 
and its relevance in understanding the interplay of identities at Gezi. Finally, 
research conducted with activists from the protests describing their reasons 
for participating and relationships across groups will be presented.
Background to the Gezi Park Protests
In order to understand who the protestors were, why they were there 
and what they wanted, KONDA researchers conducted a study with 4411 
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participants in Gezi Park during the f irst week of June.1 Of those partici-
pants, 93.6 per cent stated that they had come to Gezi Park as a ‘simple 
citizen,’ whereas only 6.4 per cent of the participants said they were part 
of an organisation or political party. Citing KONDA, it can be seen that a 
majority of those who attended the protests did so as individuals, and that 
close to half had never participated in a protest before. As will be discussed 
later, many activists stated their initial participation in the protest was as 
an individual rather than as a representative of a group. This could account 
for the difference between the numbers participating as individuals and 
the percentage of previous participation.2
When asked why they attended the protests, participants cited such 
reasons as restrictions on freedom, opposition to the policies of the AKP 
government, reaction against the words of Prime Minister Erdoğan and 
opposing the destruction of Gezi Park. Issues of freedom and police brutality 
were the principle motivations for the protestors across the board, though 
considering the differing ideologies represented at the park, more group-
specif ic reasons for participation were also expected.3 In the following 
sections, we will examine social psychological perspectives for participation 
in collective action.
Social Psychological Perspectives on Collective Action
The birth of the industrial revolution in Europe and North America placed 
the concept of the crowd (or the masses) at the forefront of society. Under-
standing the crowd as a representative of the masses at large made it all the 
more important for the elite to demonise it, in part as an effort to prevent 
the lower classes from gaining power and disrupting traditional hierarchies. 
For many, crowds represented an end to perceived stability and the birth of 
a reign of anarchy, and quickly became a fascinating new area of research.
Gustave Le Bon remains one of the most inf luential researchers of 
crowd dynamics to date. His seminal work was published in 1895 and 
has managed to sway the understanding of mass politics throughout the 
twentieth century. Le Bon saw the crowd as submerging the rationality 
1 http://www.genar.com.tr/f iles/GEZIPARKI_PROFIL-SON.pdf.
2 Another study by Istanbul Bilgi University was conducted the same week and showed 
similar results: http://t24.com.tr/haber/gezi-parki-direniscileriyle-yapilan-anketten-cikan-
ilginc-sonuclar /231335. 
3 For more social psychological research on identif ication at Gezi Park, see Uluğ and Solak 
2013 and for groups at Gezi Park, see Dalğar et al. 2013. 
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and self-consciousness of its members, turning it into a primitive, base and 
ghastly group of people. According to Le Bon, individuals lose all sense of 
self when they become part of a crowd. They are unable to ‘resist any passing 
idea or emotion,’ as they have lost their intellect.
Later theorists did not assume such abnormality in crowd behaviour, but 
rather imagined that some existing group process functioned to generate 
purpose and order within the crowd. They claimed that crowd behaviour 
should not be understood as a lack of personal sense of self but as a shift in 
understanding of the self from the individual to the group level.
If the crowd is defined as a social group, it follows that the same processes 
of social categorisation and identif ication will determine crowd action. 
Crowd members, while identifying with the crowd, infer not just what is 
normal for an ideal and typical group member but also what the limits of 
group behaviour are. This is why, in some instances, though violence may 
occur, it is directed toward specif ic targets (e.g. the police) and is selective 
and patterned (Feagin and Hahn 1973; Stephenson 1979).4
Social identity theory (e.g. Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987; also 
see Abrams and Hogg 2010) posits the concept of social identity, which can 
be understood as the part of the self-concept derived from our membership 
in social groups. Social identity is multiple and part of a complex system, 
rather than a single unit. Social identity defines in terms of ‘we’ rather than 
‘I’ (personal identity), as members of a social category in relation to other 
social categories (Turner 1991, 1999; Turner et al. 1987).
Contrary to deindividuation and the Le Bon tradition, social identity 
theory proposes that group behaviour will occur irrespective of anonymity 
and identif iability when social identity is salient (Reicher 1987; see also 
Abrams 1985). Within the confines of this approach, social identity, rather 
than personal identity, is salient. That is, rather than a loss of identity in 
the group, there is a switch of identity in the group from personal to social.
When it comes to group behaviour, we define ourselves along the lines 
of the behaviour of other group members. That is, we engage in self-stere-
otyping based on the relevant identity in a particular context and perform 
the behaviour that is expected for those group members in that situation. 
With regard to Gezi, if that behaviour is building barricades or dancing the 
tango, we build barricades or dance the tango. Which category is relevant 
at which time is f lexible and, oftentimes, what is relevant or salient at the 
moment is the identity that comes to the forefront and through which we 
tend to behave in that given moment. The question is not just ‘what do we 
4 See http://roarmag.org/2014/01/women-gezi-park-protests/.
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do in this situation?,’ but rather ‘what is appropriate as a group member in 
this particular situation?’
Antecedents to Collective Action
Having established an identity and group-based understanding to collec-
tive action, it is worthwhile taking a moment to examine what precedes 
participation. Simon and Klandermans (2001) point to the need for group 
members to be aware of their shared group membership, their common 
enemy or opponent, as well as the wider societal conflict of the power 
struggle. They state that feeling aggrieved, an awareness that it is a shared 
grievance (with other group members) and the designation of an external 
enemy are necessary f irst steps in engaging in a power struggle on behalf 
of their group. It is then important to feel that engaging in protest will be 
eff icacious in redressing grievances (Klandermans 1984, 1997).
A meta-analysis of 180 studies of collective action conducted by van 
Zomeren, Postmes and Spears (2008) attempted to integrate perspectives of 
antecedents for collective action. The proposed Social Identity Model of Col-
lective Action (SIMCA) describes identity, perceived injustice and perceived 
eff icacy as the important conditions and predictive elements of collective 
action, showing that perceptions of illegitimacy (injustice) indeed function to 
create a sense of need for collective action. In this model, identity has a very 
important role, as it is both a direct predictor of collective action as well as 
an indirect predictor, which might follow the injustice and efficacy pathways 
(Thomas et al. 2011). However, there is also another possibility in collective 
action that identity might play a less important role than perceived injustice.
Creating a Group from the Crowd
Overall, psycho-social perspectives function based on constructs of social 
identity and related elements. Thomas et al. (2011) proposed an Encapsulated 
Model of Social Identity in Collective Action (EMSICA) as an alternative to 
the SIMCA model mentioned above. In this model, as in the SIMCA model, 
social identity is still important. However, Thomas et al. (2011) claim that 
social identity can be a mediator for injustice and eff icacy in predicting 
collective action. The situation in Gezi Park explains this phenomenon. 
People participated in the Gezi Park protests across Turkey based first on the 
perception of injustice rather than on a shared identity. However, later, when 
Prime Minister Erdoğan called all the protestors – who were from very diverse 
groups – çapulcu (looter), protestors defined themselves as such as well. As 
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in the model, group formation comes later, based on shared perceptions of 
injustice and efficacy. Different people who share the same perception of 
injustice felt as one under the guise of the çapulcu, or resister, identity.
In trying to understand how a sense of ‘oneness’ can emerge from the 
crowd, it is clear that issues of identity and the group are highly important. 
A sense of shared identity with other protesters allows the individual to see 
her/his fate as connected to the fate of those around her/him. The stronger 
the belief that what happens to all happens to the individual, the more 
likely the individual is to feel an attachment to the group and to perceive 
injustice against other members as injustice against the self.
The Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) (Gaertner and Dovidio 
2000; Gaertner et al. 1993) advocates eliminating intergroup boundaries by 
either increasing the salience of an existing common ingroup identity or 
creating a new, more inclusive identity for subgroups. Research has yielded 
positive f indings for the effectiveness of this perspective, though questions 
of equal status and shared threat are important to note (Dovidio et al. 
2004). Especially in the face of a common outgroup threat (e.g. the police), 
multiple groups functioning under a single superordinate identity can be 
highly effective.
There is an important caveat, however. Social identity theory argues that 
group members have a motivation to maintain distinctiveness for their 
ingroup from the outgroup. According to the social identity perspective, 
self-esteem is partially attained from the social groups (e.g. friend groups, 
political parties, football fans, national citizens) individuals belong to. It is 
important, therefore, that the attainment of a positive self-evaluation relies 
on the individual’s ability to positively differentiate between their ingroup 
and relevant outgroups.
Based on these perspectives, we argue that there are two main reasons 
why the Gezi Park protests were able to bring people together so effectively: 
the existence of a salient outgroup (i.e. the police) and the existence of a 
superordinate category (i.e. çapulcu, protester, resister) that did not impinge 
on pre-existing subgroup categories (i.e. Anti-capitalist Muslims, Kemalists). 
In the frame of the Gezi Park protests, a member of any group present there 
should be able to maintain her or his identity as a party member while also 
considering her- or himself a protester in the park. When the police make 
their presence felt, the protester (superordinate) identity should become 
more salient, and when the police retreat, the party member (subordinate) 
identity should become more salient. In the following, the dynamics of the 
protesters both within and between groups will be discussed with a case 
study from the Gezi Park activists.
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‘We Are More than Alliances between Groups’: An Identity-based 
Analysis of the Gezi Park Protest Activists
Crowd dynamics are quite complex to understand. However, in line with 
the literature, we also argue that in today’s world, crowd identity plays an 
important role in collective action participation. In order to understand 
the ingroup, outgroup and superordinate group dynamics and to explore 
participants’ position in relation to self and being part of a particular group, 
the relationship between ingroup(s) and outgroup(s), and how participants 
position themselves in terms of reasons for participation at Gezi Park, in-
depth interviews were conducted with activists who participated in the 
protests.5
Participants’ groups were chosen based on their visibility in the protests. 
They included: 1) Alevi activists; 2) Anti-capitalist Muslims/Revolutionary 
Muslims; 3) members of the football fan group Çarşı; 4) women’s rights 
activists; 5) Kemalists (ADD, TGB, İP [İşçi Partisi]); 6) Kurdish activists; 7) 
LGBTI activists; 8) trades union members; 9) members of the TKP; and 10) 
Ülkücüler (Nationalist Movement Party or Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP; 
Ülkü Ocakları). Participants were activists who participated frequently in 
the Gezi Park protests in different cities across Turkey. In total, 24 partici-
pants were interviewed. Participants were asked whether they attended 
the protests as a member of their group or alone, how important their 
activist identity is for them and why their own group attended the protests. 
Participants were also asked to name any groups they felt close to (or not 
close to) in order to understand the relationships across different groups 
in the protests. Thematic analysis was applied to the transcriptions of the 
interviews. In the following, the perspectives of participants from each 
group will be represented.
1) Alevi Activists (Ankara and Hatay): Alevi participants noted specif ic 
reasons for their participation in the protests, referring to ethnic and 
religious discrimination as well as regional issues (especially in Hatay). 
Participants discussed perceptions of assimilationist policies on the 
part of the government towards Alevis. Participants also noted the role 
of the AKP in the conflict in Syria, believing the AKP to be working in 
conjunction with Al-Qaeda and Al Nusra and using Hatay as a logistics 
centre.
5 For full interviews, see Uluğ and Acar 2014.
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 Especially for the participant living in Hatay, Alevi identity was very 
salient both as a religious and as a cultural identity. On the other 
hand, the participant from Tuzluçayır said that his socialist identity 
was more important than his Alevi identity. Both felt close to Çarşı, 
a group of supporters of the Beşiktaş football club, and members of 
the People’s House (Halkevleri). They did not feel close to the İP, TGB 
and some leftist parties who they felt discredited the Gezi movement.
2) Anti-capitalist Muslims/Revolutionary Muslims (Ankara and Istanbul): 
Anti-capitalist Muslims and Revolutionary Muslims stated that they 
believe property belongs to God (‘a park belonging to the public, given 
away to the “capitalist followers” of the AKP, is not something the 
people can tolerate’). They saw the AKP government as endangering 
the environment by continually building shopping centres around 
the country, and they stated that Muslims should rather live in peace 
with nature. According to participants, Gezi Park is the only place in 
Taksim where people can sit for free and they did not want to see that 
change. Importantly, they also wanted to show that the protesters are 
not enemies of religion, as implied by members of the ‘Islamist’ AKP 
government, and which they thought was incorrectly expressed through 
the AKP.
 The Anti-capitalist and Revolutionary Muslim identity was important 
for the participants while they were attending the protests, and more 
so for the participant who attended in Istanbul than the participant 
from Ankara. As part of the occupation, many groups, including the 
Anti-capitalist and Revolutionary Muslims, pitched tents in Gezi Park, 
implying a more concrete and permanent identity-based presence. They 
felt close to Kaldıraç (an LGBTI organisation), Çarşı and socialist and 
communist groups in the protests. The only group they did not feel 
close to was TGB, but stated ‘if we are bothered [by the presence of] 
any other group, this would be against the Gezi spirit.’
3) Çarşı (Istanbul): A fan group of Beşiktaş supporters, Çarşı is a group 
highly involved with social issues. Participants made a point of stating 
that Çarşı has a conscience; in their own words, ‘where there is injustice, 
Çarşı is there, too.’ Çarşı members were active both in Gezi Park and 
in their own district of Beşiktaş, where there were particularly harsh 
clashes between protesters and police. One reason they cited for their 
participation was the proximity of the protests to what they considered 
their ‘home turf.’ With police encroachment in Beşiktaş, Çarşı members 
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felt an obligation to ‘protect’ their neighbourhood. According to Çarşı 
members, the AKP has taken hold of all institutions (even the football 
league) and blocked all other existing ways of seeking democracy.
 Participants indicated that they attended the protests with their Çarşı 
identity, with their personal identity and with their leftist identity 
(though not all members of Çarşı are leftists). They also mentioned that 
these identities intertwined during the protests. They felt close to other 
fan groups such as Tek Yumruk (Galatasaray), Karakızıl (Gençlerbirliği), 
Halkın Takımı, Beleştepe, Fenerbahçe Sol Açık, Vamos Bien and Öteki 1907. 
They also felt close to Taksim Solidarity and the TKP. They said they did 
not feel close to TGB, the CHP and the Kurdish movement. Ultimately, 
all participants from Çarşı emphasised that being a part of the protests 
was a privilege, irrespective of identity and ideology.
4) Women’s rights activists (Ankara and Istanbul): The visibility of women 
in general during the protests was quite high.6 Women’s rights activists 
discussed many reasons for that visibility, including attacks on women, 
women feeling their place is restricted in the public sphere and feeling 
they have no right to speak. In general, participants discussed their 
reasons for protest as being related to the AKP’s aggressive policies 
against women and their rhetoric of control over women. They specif i-
cally mentioned bans on abortion and the morning after pill, pressure 
on women by the government to have three children, the murder of 
women and feeling that they have no safe haven when they are exposed 
to violence.
 Participants indicated that they were in the streets as women because 
this identity had become increasingly important during the AKP rule. 
They emphasised that there is no place for women in the AKP’s gov-
ernment. Participants felt close to the LGBTI movement, the Kurdish 
movement, anarchists and the Anti-capitalist Muslims. They also said 
that they could stand together with TGB and İP, though they criticised 
Kemalists in general.
5) Kemalists (ADD – Rize, TGB – Hatay and Istanbul, İP – Mersin): Under 
the Kemalist umbrella, participants were members of two NGOs: the 
ADD and the TGB, as well as one political party (İP). Participants stated 
that Kemalists had joined the protests to object to the bans on the 
celebration of national holidays, the ‘disappearance of secularism’ and 
6 See http://roarmag.org/2014/01/women-gezi-park-protests/.
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the AKP’s interventions that effectively tied the hands of the military. 
In addition, they were protesting to protect the Republic of Turkey, 
founded by Atatürk, and to protect the unity and integrity of the nation.
 Participants from TGB indicated that they were in the protests with 
their TGB identity. On the other hand, there were times when the 
participants were present with their personal, rather than their activist 
identity. Participants from the İP in Mersin and ADD in Rize stated 
that they did not participate with their activist identity because the 
protests in these cities were more like community gatherings, rather 
than gatherings of organisations, as in Istanbul.
 All of the Kemalist participants felt close to the LGBTI movement, CHP, 
TGB, TKP and some environmentalist platforms, such as the Fellow-
ship of Rivers Platform (Derelerin Kardeşliği Platformu). However, the 
Kemalists did not feel close to the Kurdish movement.
6) Kurdish Activists (Istanbul): The reasons mentioned by Kurdish activists 
were more general compared to the other groups. They mentioned the 
importance of protecting the green spaces in the city centre, which, 
during times of disaster, are meant to be used as meeting places. 
They expressed a desire to prevent urban renewal projects and they 
objected to police violence and to the media’s deliberate negligence in 
appropriately covering police brutality during the protests. Participants 
stated that the violence they observed during the protests reminded 
them of the treatment of Kurds in the 1990s.7 The Kurdish participants 
discussed the AKP’s attempts to impose on all areas of life through 
‘oppression, prohibition, insult and humiliation.’ However, the foremost 
reason for participants was Sırrı Süreyya Önder’s (parliamentarian 
of the pro-Kurdish BDP) presence in the park and his support for the 
protests since their inception.
 Two participants indicated that their Kurdish identity was less impor-
tant during the protests. Rather, their socialist, environmentalist and/
or labourer identity was more important. One participant commented 
on this issue, stating, ‘if you live in Turkey, you have many identities. In 
the Gezi protests, we brought all of these identities together.’
 Kurds felt close to the Anti-capitalist Muslims, Revolutionary Muslims, 
LGBTI movement, feminists, Çarşı, Tek Yumruk and Sol Açık, sex work-
ers, voluntary health care workers and some socialist political parties, 
7 Throughout the 1990s, a great deal of violence and oppression was inflicted on the Kurds 
due to the state of emergency legislation; it remains a bitter memory in the minds of many. 
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such as the Socialist Democracy Party (Sosyalist Demokrasi Partisi), 
the Labour Party (Emek Partisi), the Socialist Party of the Oppressed 
(Ezilenlerin Sosyalist Partisi), the Socialist Solidarity Platform (Sosyalist 
Dayanışma Platformu) and the Socialist Party of Refoundation (Sosyalist 
Yeniden Kuruluş Partisi). On the other hand, Kurds did not feel close to 
the İP and TGB.
7) LGBTI groups (Istanbul): LGBTI participants were in the protests to 
indicate that the park and Taksim are an especially important meeting 
space for their community. Participants stated that the LGBTI community 
could never get along well with the police, law enforcement agencies and 
other authority figures, because they have a problem with the ‘patriarchal, 
male-dominated, authoritarian, fascist, heteronormative system.’ They 
participated in the protests to respond to the state’s violent, brutal and 
fascist attitude, and also mentioned specific incidents of attacks on friends.
 Participants from the LGBTI movement indicated that they were in the 
protests not only with their LGBTI identity, but also with other identities. 
One participant stated, ‘identity was of no importance anymore during 
the protests.’ They felt close to the Anti-capitalist Muslims, vegans, 
feminists, Çarşı, anarchists, activists against armament (Silahlanma 
Karşıtları) and the Kurdish movement. However, some of the LGBTI 
participants criticised the Taksim Solidarity platform, leftist men from 
the ‘1968 generation’ and CHP.
8) Trades unions (Istanbul): Trades unions, such as TMMOB and the Union 
of Health and Social Service Workers (SES), participated in the protests 
against the persecution of the environment and environmentalism, the 
persecution of ‘the people’ and to prevent the AKP’s Taksim project. 
Especially in the second term of the AKP government, massive changes 
were conducted across Turkey in the name of urban renewal without 
f irst consulting with TMMOB, despite its role in appraising urban de-
velopment proposals. Participants stated very f irmly: there are certain 
living spaces in the city that just should not be touched. They were, 
therefore, against these urban renewal projects and became a barrier 
to the AKP government’s projects.8
8 In July 2013, the AKP rushed a bill through parliament that removed TMMOB from any 
planning and approval processes for urban development, interpreted as a response to TMMOB’s 
support for the Gezi Park protests. 
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 Trades union members participated in the protests both as individuals 
and with union identities. They felt close to Taksim Solidarity, Çarşı and 
the Anti-capitalist Muslims and other unions, but not to the CHP.
9) TKP (Ankara and Istanbul): Participants from the TKP were in the 
protests because ‘[their] problem is with the AKP as a whole – [they] are 
looking for total liberation.’ From their perspective, the AKP is destroy-
ing the values of the f irst Turkish Republic and creating a second one 
based on ‘everything that is an affront to humanity, such as capitalism, 
bigotry, backwardness. All come together under the AKP rule.’ Object-
ing to urban renewal was one of the biggest reasons for participation. 
In addition, participants from TKP stated that the people poured into 
the streets of their own accord and that it was the duty of the TKP to 
support and protect them. They cited this as an important reason for 
their participation.
 Participants from TKP said that they were in the protests both with their 
personal identity and their political party identity. Their political party 
identity was quite important for them and, unlike most participants, 
they stated that they were always with other party members during the 
protests. They felt close to Çarşı and the LGBTI movement, but they did 
not feel close to İP, MHP, TGB and the Kurdish movement.
10) Ülkücüler9 (MHP and Ülkü Ocakları – Ankara and Istanbul): The Ülkücü 
participants stated that they were in the protests to object to Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, ‘the most ignorant prime minister thus far, who went 
so far as to say the founders of the Republic are drunks.’ They said that 
Erdoğan sees things as black or white and does not see anything as grey. 
There were also more general objections to the leadership style of the 
prime minister, such as ‘never taking a step back, always interfering in 
all levels of government’ and ‘getting joy out of pouring salt in people’s 
wounds.’ Another important reason for participation was related to 
Ülkücü’s perception that there had been serious persecution against 
them over the last ten years, especially in the public sector. Ülkücüler 
also greatly objected to the participation of the AKP in the Oslo and 
İmralı meetings.10
9 Ülkücüler is a group of MHP. They refer to themselves as ‘Turkish nationalists.’
10 The AKP conducted meetings with the PKK in Oslo and the imprisoned leader of the party 
in İmralı in order to negotiate peace for the Kurdish conflict. 
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 The situation of the Ülkücüler in the protests was different from other 
participants, because of the criticism coming from MHP leader Devlet 
Bahçeli. At the beginning of the protests, the participants said they at-
tended with their Ülkücü identity. However, after Devlet Bahçeli stated 
that those who wanted to attend the protests should resign from the 
party, some Ülkücüler continued to participate in the protests indi-
vidually, rather than with a party or group identity. These participants 
indicated that they did not feel close to any groups – especially to the 
Kurdish movement – in the Gezi Park protests except for the Anti-
capitalist Muslims and Revolutionary Muslims.
Conclusion
Even though every group interviewed had different motivations and reasons 
for participating in the Gezi Park protests, it is still possible to f ind some 
commonalities between each group. These similarities include dissatisfac-
tion with the AKP, the struggle for rights such as democracy, freedom and 
equality, and objecting to excessive police force. Participants also discussed 
standing against injustice, especially in cases where a friend was injured, 
the AKP ignoring the public (or being against the prime minister’s ‘I’ll do 
what I want’ attitude), recent events related to AKP policy (e.g. prohibitions 
against alcohol, internet censorship, increased restrictions on women’s 
rights) and not protecting the green space in the cities. In addition, when 
talking about the protestors in the Gezi resistance, participants used words 
such as ‘we (all),’ ‘each of us,’ ‘all of us,’ ‘none of us’ and ‘everyone.’ These simi-
larities point to the bigger or superordinate identity rather than separate 
activist identities of those who attended the protests for different reasons.
There were other similarities between different groups in the protests. 
For example, many groups in the protests felt close to Anti-capitalist and 
Revolutionary Muslims, Çarşı and the LGBTI movement, while most criti-
cised Kemalist groups such as TGB and İP. There was an ambivalent attitude 
towards the Kurdish movement by several groups in the protests. While 
some felt they would have liked to see increased support from the Kurdish 
movement, a divide between Ülkücüler and Kemalists and the Kurdish 
movement can be felt quite clearly in the discourse of the participants.
Another important factor was the city in which participants attended 
protests. Region affected their involvement and identif ication with their 
own groups in the context of the Gezi Park protests. In Istanbul, there 
were many tents for the groups where activists could go and spend their 
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time with other ingroup members, whereas in other cities this was not 
the case. According to participants, groups were less important in other 
cities. This does not necessarily mean that the activist identity was not 
important; simply that it depended on the context where the identity(s) 
becomes salient.
Following the initial events in Gezi Park, protests sprang up in all but 
two cities across Turkey. They became a forum for airing grievances related 
to numerous issues; but, in one way or another, all indicated a reaction to 
AKP policies. Unlike other protests or the public airing of grievances seen 
previously in Turkey, individuals and groups from very different political 
and social backgrounds found themselves united against the police and the 
AKP government. In order to be able to stand together, the protesters had 
to f ind ways to negotiate not only how to respond to outgroup threat, but 
also the history of their own intergroup relationships.
A social psychological perspective allows us to examine these dynam-
ics more analytically. As discussed above, identity has an important role 
in today’s collective action. Yet, we cannot speak of any single identity; 
beyond personal identity, a person has as many social identities as groups 
exist in the world. Rather, it is the case-specif ic ingroup, outgroup and 
superordinate group identities that have more of an explanatory power for 
collective action, especially for the Gezi Park protests. Participants still kept 
their central activist identity as a feminist, member of Çarşı or anything 
else, while being a Çapulcu or resister when positioning themselves against 
an outgroup such as the police. Unlike Le Bon’s argument that protestors 
lose all sense of self in the crowd, the activist identity of Gezi participants 
remained intact. It influenced their behaviour through group norms and 
functioned within the superordinate identity formed at the park under the 
Çapulcu identity. The importance of the social context and identity relations 
helps put into perspective the relationships between the individual and 
the group, the groups themselves, how they all relate to a superordinate 
category and how that category functions against a salient outgroup such 
as the police.
These dynamics were made especially clear through interviews with 
participants, who discussed the importance of their activist identities 
during the protests; even influencing where, why and how they protested. 
They also demonstrated the degree to which those identities coloured their 
interactions with other activists and perspectives on other participants, 
who, despite profound disagreements in position, were still able to see 
each other as ingroups within the larger category. In the Gezi Park con-
text, we can also argue that when there was no police – in other words, no 
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outgroup – the differences within superordinate identity were clearer and 
active. However, when the police was visible or police brutality was high, 
the differences within ingroup(s) were less important (see also Drury and 
Reicher 2000; Reicher 2004).
The Gezi Park protests sparked interest in numerous areas of study and 
are likely to continue to do so. The protests allow for the examination of 
policy, politics, social status, human relationships and many other issues. A 
social psychological perspective on group participation is just one piece of a 
growing puzzle of a case study that will continue to influence work to come.
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